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I. INTRODUCTION 
The existing state of research on individual satisfaction suggests that reported subjective well-
being is a satisfactory empirical approximation of individual utility, that can be applied in 
socio-economic research (Oswald, 1997; Easterlin, 2002; Frey and Stutzer, 2002; 
Hamermesh, 2004). The evidence adduced to date has shown that education appears to have a 
significant impact on the different satisfaction domains of individuals. For example, Van 
Praag et al., (2003) conclude that individuals with higher education are significantly more 
satisfied with their health, thus indicating that more highly educated individuals enjoy a 
healthier life style. Belfield and Harris (2002), Gazioglu and Tansel (2006) and Fleming and 
Kler (2007) also find a significant relationship between satisfaction and educational level. For 
their part, Clark and Oswald (1994 and 1996) and Clark et al. (1996) observe that highly 
educated people are less content with respect to their job satisfaction when other factors 
(income, etc.) are controlled for. The possible explanation here is that this low level of 
contentment might result from the significant reduction in income of those with lower 
qualifications. Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Van Praag (2003) produce ambiguous evidence for 
income satisfaction in Germany. On the one hand, they find that more education leads to more 
efficient consumption, which would appear to point to a positive effect on income 
satisfaction; on the other hand, more education widens the individual’s horizon, thereby 
giving rise to increased expectations, which carries with it a negative effect as anticipated by 
neoclassical economic theory. 
Despite the clear relevance of the evidence, the effects of education on satisfaction have 
usually been studied in a way that does not reflect the fact that the household is composed of 
interdependent spouses. The literature reflects only a limited number of exceptions to this 
approach. Thus, Schwarze (2004) finds that parental life satisfaction increases with a child’s 
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years of education. Health and education can serve as an approximation of income or future 
earnings, as has been confirmed in Blanchflower and Oswald (2004). In this way, if parents 
make some level of investment in their children’s education while the children are still young, 
they can expect some returns when they become older. Thus, a positive impact of children’s 
education on parental life satisfaction can also be driven by an exchange motive. Within 
couples, Groot and Maassen Van Den Brink (2002) study the effect of age and education 
differences between spouses on happiness, finding that female life satisfaction increases if the 
education gap between husband and wife is smaller. 
In this line of modelling individual satisfaction within the household, as a fully 
interdependent process, this paper assumes the collective approach, in which one spouse’s 
satisfaction not only depends on his/her own determinants, but also on the other spouse’s 
variables, in order to model the effects of both own and spouse’s education levels on 
individual economic satisfaction (Chiappori, 1988, 1992; Browning and Chiappori,  1998; 
Chiappori et al., 2002). Additionally, we also consider the influence of other individual and 
economic variables, such as age, the number of children, wages and non-wage incomes. The 
collective approach adopted in this paper makes it possible to derive some stochastic 
formulations which are then estimated for 14 EU countries, using the panel structure which 
results from the eight waves of the European Community Household Panel-ECHP (1994-
2001).   
With respect to the estimation strategy, this takes the form of four consecutive 
estimations, namely pool, fixed effects, random effects and efficient generalized instrumental 
variables. The fixed or random effects methods correct the heterogeneity bias that appears 
when the use of subjective variables could imply that some people look at life either 
pessimistically or optimistically, even though there is “really” no difference in their level of 
well-being (Clark and Oswald, 2002; Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004; Senik, 2004). 
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Moreover, it is well known that individual behaviour is oriented towards achieving higher 
satisfaction levels. As a consequence, all the variables which can be chosen by individuals 
will be endogenous in the satisfaction regression, in such a way that the majority of estimated 
parameters obtained by standard regressions are likely to be underestimated. A standard 
solution to this endogeneity bias, which depends on the degree that individuals can choose 
their actions in order to be better off, is to use instrumental variables (Powdthavee, 2004; 
Schwarze, 2004). After carrying out all these estimations, the strategy selects the one that is 
statistically most appropriate in every case, by using the LM value, as well as two Hausman 
tests (Baltagi et al., 2003). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section we describe the 
data. Next section is dedicated to the stochastic formulation. The following section is devoted 
to the empirical results and, finally, we close the paper with a summary of the most relevant 
conclusions. 
 
II. DATA 
Bearing in mind that the purpose of the study is to study the effects of both own and spouse’s 
education levels on individual economic satisfaction, for individuals who work as wage 
earners, the data used in this work comes from the eight waves of the ECHP (1994-2001) for 
each of the 14 sample EU countries.1 In our study, households have been selected in which 
both spouses are aged between 16 and 65 years old. Individuals both with and without 
children have been included in these households. Those households lacking the required 
information have been excluded, resulting in two sub-samples, male wage earners and female 
 
1 The ECHP is an extensive, sample-based panel survey in which the same households and individuals are 
interviewed annually. The data come from a standardised questionnaire and are designed to be cross-nationally 
comparable (Peracchi, 2002). 
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wage earners, with the number of observations ranging from France (17,623 husbands and 
13,589 wives) to Luxembourg (1,288 husbands and 774 wives). 
The ECHP includes questions about several subjective aspects of well-being, enquiring 
into the level of satisfaction that individuals reach with respect to different aspects, such as 
their income. The specific question this paper is interested in is: “How satisfied are you with 
your financial situation?”. Each of these responses takes values from 1 to 6, moving from not 
satisfied at all (1) to completely satisfied (6). This satisfaction question is based on 
individuals’ own perception, in such a way that Table 1 begins by showing the simple means 
which are comparable across the populations, after assuming linearity across responses. 
Table 1 shows the mean and standard deviation of the dependent variables used in the 
analysis. The dependent variables are husband and wife income satisfaction (HusbSatisf,
WifeSatisf). Starting with the male sample, it can be appreciated that for male wage earners, 
these generally declare higher satisfaction levels than their respective wives in the majority of 
the sample countries, namely Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain. With respect to the female sample, it emerges that female wage earners 
report higher satisfaction levels than their respective husbands, this being the case for all 
sample countries, save Portugal.  
(Table 1) 
With respect to the exogenous variables, the study includes both own and spouse’s 
education levels (HusbPrimEduc, HusbSeconEduc, HusbHighEduc, WifePrimEduc, 
WifeSeconEduc, WifeHighEduc), as well as a number of individual characteristics  and several 
economic variables. As regards individual characteristics, they include the age of the spouses 
(HusbAge, WifeAge), the age difference between the spouses (AgeDifference), as well as two 
other variables which refer to the presence of children in the household: a dummy variable 
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indicating if there is a child under 12 in the household (Children<12), and another indicating 
the number of children under 16 (Children<16). Additionally, we include the percentages of 
self-employed and wage-earning wives in the husband’s sample (WifeWage-Earner, WifeSelf-
Employed), and the percentage of self-employed and wage-earning husbands in the wife’s 
sample (HusbSelf-Employed, HusbWage-Earner). With respect to the variables which refer to 
the economic situation of the household, these include the wages of both spouses (HusbWage, 
WifeWage), as well as the annual non-wage incomes of both the husband and the wife 
(HusbNon-WageInc, WifeNon-WageInc), and the wife’s participation in the household income 
(WifeParticipation).  
Table 2 shows the mean and the standard deviation of each of the exogenous variables 
used in the analysis. As regards the education level, it can be noted in the majority of 
countries, and for both samples of wage-earners, that wives generally show a higher 
percentage than husbands for the primary education level. By contrast, the percentage of 
husbands who have attained higher education levels is generally greater than that 
corresponding to wives, with this evidence appearing generally in the male sample, but not at 
all in the female sample. The percentage of husbands who have secondary education is higher 
than that corresponding to wives who have attained this level, this being the case in both 
samples of male and female wage-earners, with the exceptions only of Germany and Ireland. 
(Table 2) 
In every sample country analysed, the age of the husband is greater than that of the wife 
in both samples of males and females. The age difference is greater for the female sample, 
with the highest mean value corresponding to Greece in both sample groups, where this age 
difference reaches 4.6 years. With respect to the variables that refer to the presence of 
children in the household, note that the percentages are higher in the male sample (where 
wives can be either wage-earners or self-employed) in the majority of the countries, namely in 
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Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom, with the highest values corresponding to 
Austria. However, there appears to be clear evidence that the mean number of children under 
16 is higher for the sample of male wage-earners than for the female sample, this being the 
case in every sample country.  
From this simple descriptive analysis it also emerges that the husband’s mean income 
per hour is higher than that of the wife’s for both male and female wage-earners in every 
sample country. We can further note the smaller wage gap in the sample of female wage-
earners, and the highest values being reached for the male sample in Finland and 
Luxembourg. With respect to non-wage annual incomes, the wife’s non-wage income is 
higher than that of the husband’s in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland and the United Kingdom in the male wage earner sample. However, in the female 
wage-earner sample, the husband’s non wage income is higher than that of the wife in every 
country, save Belgium and Denmark. Finally, note the higher percentage of wage-earner 
wives, as compared to self-employed wives, in the sample of male wage-earners and of 
female wage-earners, respectively, in all EU sample countries.  
 
III. THE MODEL 
This section develops the model specification and its estimation procedure. In order to 
describe the empirical specification to model the effects of both own and spouse’s education 
levels on individual economic satisfaction, we first adopt the family collective approach. On 
the basis of the assumption that intra-household decisions are Pareto-efficient, this approach 
considers that the household consists of two working-age individuals, A = husband and B =
wife, whose rational preferences could be represented by indirect utility functions, defined in 
Page 7 of 23
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
7
terms of their own exogenous variables, as well as in terms of the other member’s variables. 
Moreover, the panel data structure provided by the ECHP permits the application of 
techniques that help to control for unobservable heterogeneity. On these theoretical and 
empirical bases, the stochastic formulation underlying the observed subjective well-being 
responses takes the form of linear functions: 
I I A A B B A A B B A A B B A A B B I I
it it 1 it 2 it 3 it 4 it 1 it 2 it 3 it 4 it i itv ED ED z z w w y y eµ     = + + + + + + + + + +     
i =1, …, N; t =1, …, T ; I =A,B (1) 
where vit corresponds to the income subjective satisfaction of the individual i in period t, with 
this t being the current period, whereas an individual can be in the sample a maximum of T
periods. This dependent variable, vit,, is explained, according to the collective framework, by a 
number of exogenous variables. Thus, itED and itz represent the education and other socio-
demographic characteristics, respectively; itw and ity are wages and non-labour incomes; the 
parameters  and  represent the coefficients; µ and  are constant terms, with µ being  the 
average population and  the individual deviation with respect to this average; and, finally, e
are the error terms that are supposed to be independent, with null mean and constant variance. 
These equations are estimated independently for both spouses, in such a way that N is the 
number of households in the sample.   
The estimation strategy follows these steps.2 First, each equation is estimated separately, 
considering the aggregated data, that is to say, a pool estimation is carried out. A panel data 
structure is then used in order to estimate functions, considering individual effects, both fixed 
and random. As is well known, the difference between the two lies in the fact that, while, in 
 
2 Given the ordinal nature of the dependent variable on individual satisfaction, an appropriate regression model 
would be an ordered probit. However, while a random-effects ordered probit model is available in standard 
statistical software packages (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Van Praag, 2003; Schwarze, 2004; Winkelmann, 2005), the 
fixed-effects ordered probit estimator is not. This is why the present paper uses as approximations both random-
effects and fixed-effects regression models, which are perfectly comparable by using habitual tests (D’Ambrosio 
and Frick, 2004; Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004; Graham et al., 2004). 
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8
the case of fixed effects, the  coefficients are considered as fixed values for each individual, 
in the specification of random effects, the specific aspects of each spouse are taken as 
independent random variables. 
 Consideration is also given to an alternative estimation procedure suggested in the 
literature, namely the Efficient Generalized Instrumental Variables (EGIV), proposed by 
Hausman and Taylor (1981).3 The method followed in this paper uses as instruments the  
individual time averages of the variables (the individual’s own wage, the presence of children 
under 12, the number of children under 16, the spouse’s own wage, male and female non-
labour income, the wife’s participation in household income, own age and a dummy that 
indicates if the individual is self-employed) for the time-invariant variables that are correlated 
with the individual effects (the age difference between the spouses, the individual‘s own 
education levels, and the spouse’s higher education level). Thus, this procedure allows for the 
simultaneous control of the correlation between regressors and unobserved individual effects, 
by using instruments. Similarly, it permits the identification of the estimates of the time-
invariant covariates, such as education. Moreover, it avoids the insecurity associated with the 
choice of suitable instruments, since the individual means over time of all the included 
regressors can serve as valid instruments. Additionally, the variance-covariance structure can 
be taken into account so as to obtain more efficient estimators. 
 This EGIV method is implemented in the following steps. First, equations (1) are 
estimated by pooled Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS), where the set of variables mentioned 
above act as instruments. Second, the pooled 2SLS residuals are used to construct the weights 
for a Feasible Generalized Least Squares estimator. Third, these weights are used to transform 
(by quasi-time demeaning) all the dependent variables, explanatory variables and instrumental 
 
3 The recent work by Baltagi et al., (2003) provides information on the suitability of the Hausman-Taylor 
procedure in a general framework where panel data is available and some regressors are correlated with the 
individual effects. 
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variables. Finally, the transformed regression is again estimated by pooled 2SLS, where the 
individual means over time of the time-varying regressors, and the exogenous time-invariant 
regressors, are the instruments. Under the full set of assumptions, this Hausman and Taylor 
estimator coincides with the efficient GMM estimator. 
 After estimating the four alternative specifications, some appropriate econometric tests 
allow for the best formulation to be selected in every case. In particular, an LM test indicates 
if a panel or a pool estimation is preferred. If a panel estimation is selected, then a choice 
must be made from among the three alternative specifications, with two Hausman tests 
allowing the best panel estimation to be selected (Hausman, 1978).4 The first Hausman test 
(Hausman-1) is the standard to distinguish between the random and fixed effects estimators, 
and the second (Hausman-2) tests the Hausman-Taylor against the fixed effects model.5
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 3 includes the empirical results for both sub-samples, male wage earners and female 
wage earners. We begin with a brief description of the test results that allows us to select a 
particular estimation procedure for each sample country. First, the LM tests indicate that the 
pool estimation is not selected in any sample country. Second, Hausman-1 tests reveal that the 
fixed effects estimation is preferred over random effects and, third, Hausman-2 tests indicate 
that, for all cases, save for male wage earners in Austria, the Hausman-Taylor estimation is 
preferred over the fixed effects. 
(Table 3) 
 
4 See, for details, Hausman and Taylor (1981), Wooldridge (2002) and Baltagi, Bresson and Pirotte (2003).  
5 The 8.0 version of Stata includes the Hausman-Taylor procedure and is used to obtain the estimates presented 
in this paper 
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With respect to the education variables, we show that income satisfaction significantly 
increases when husbands achieve higher education qualifications, with this result appearing in 
a significant number of cases, particularly Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Similar results have been obtained in Ferrer-i-
Carbonell and Van Praag (2003); Van Praag, Frijters and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2003) and 
Frijters, Haisken-DeNew and Shields (2004). As regards the effect of a wife’s higher 
education on her husband’s income satisfaction, this appears to increase in France, which can 
be interpreted as that the wife can better appreciate the necessary effort of her husband to 
reach a certain level of income and, therefore, according to the cooperative nature of the 
relationship between spouses, this assessment increases the husband’s satisfaction with 
respect to his level of income. By contrast, the effect decreases in Finland and Germany, 
where the wife’s higher education does not imply a higher assessment of her spouse’s effort 
to reach a certain level of income. 
Wives’ higher education increases income satisfaction of wives in Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal. The wife is affected more than the husband by the spouse’s education level, in such 
a way that income satisfaction is increased when the husband has received higher education, 
in the cases of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United 
Kingdom. Groot and Maasen Van Den Brink (2002) find that husbands typically tend to be 
older and higher educated than their wives. Education differences between spouses can effect 
marital stability and divorce rates, in such a way that life satisfaction increases when the 
education gap is smaller. This is also the case of Finland and Germany, where we can note 
that the effect of the wife’s education on the husband’s satisfaction runs in the opposite 
direction. 
Additionally, we can observe that the effect of age is significantly positive for male 
wage earners in the majority of countries, namely Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, 
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Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. This same result appears for the 
wife’s age in the female samples of Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, The 
Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom. Groot and Maasen Van Den Brink (2002) find 
that a positive age gap between husband and wife increases both male and female satisfaction, 
and we find an increase in female satisfaction in Finland and Greece. The effects of the 
presence of children vary across countries, also depending on age. Thus, we find that if the 
child is under 12, then the effect is positive in Spain and negative in Austria, Denmark, 
France and the Netherlands for male wage earners. For the female sample, we can observe the 
same result and, in addition, a negative effect in Italy and the United Kingdom, but a positive 
effect in Greece. Moreover, if the age is less than 16 years, then the effect is positive for male 
wage-earners in France and Luxembourg, and negative in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. For the female sample, it is similarly negative 
in Denmark, Greece, Ireland and the United Kingdom, but positive in France. 
Turning to the economic variables, it can be observed that increases in the husband’s 
wage has, according to the normality assumption, a highly significant positive impact on male 
satisfaction for the majority of cases, particularly for both samples in Austria, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Moreover, this same positive effect from the 
wife’s wage is also observable for both samples in France, Greece and Portugal. For their 
part, Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain show altruistic behaviour with 
respect to wage incomes, in such a way that male satisfaction positively depends on female 
wages, and female satisfaction on male wages. By contrast, all male workers in Austria, 
Finland, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom exhibit egoistic behaviour, 
with their utilities remaining indifferent  to changes in their wives’ labour incomes. With 
respect to non-wage incomes, the husband’s variable has a clearly positive effect on male and 
female income satisfaction in Greece and Portugal. Finally, it can be noted that increases in 
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the female’s share of household income increases male income satisfaction in Finland, 
Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, and decreases it in Belgium and the United 
Kingdom. Finally, note that when the wife’s participation in household income increases, so 
her satisfaction increases in the cases of Italy, Portugal and the United Kingdom. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has analysed the effects of both own and spouse’s education levels, as well as 
other individual and economic variables, on economic satisfaction for the case of European 
households. To that end, we have assumed a collective family model framework, whose 
empirical specifications (pool, fixed effects, random effects and efficient generalized 
instrumental variables) have been estimated using the eight waves of the ECHP (1994-2001). 
With respect to the selected formulation, the empirical results show that the IV 
Hausman-Taylor estimator has been selected in the majority of cases. As regards the relevant 
variables for this article, male income satisfaction significantly increases when the husband 
achieves higher education qualifications in Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. Female income satisfaction is positively related to 
her education level in Greece, Ireland and Portugal; and, additionally, to the husband’s 
education level in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal 
and the United Kingdom. 
As regards other determinants, age has a significantly positive impact on income 
satisfaction for wage earners in the majority of countries. With respect to the economic 
variables, it first appears that increases in individual wage and non-wage incomes lead to 
higher satisfaction levels. Moreover, with respect to interrelations between spouses, our 
results reveal that in France, Greece and Portugal, all workers, whether male or female, show 
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altruistic behaviour with respect to wage incomes, while in Finland, both male and female 
workers exhibit egoistic behaviour. 
An understanding of individual satisfaction derived from income within the household 
could be particularly useful for policy-makers in evaluating socio-economic policies. Thus, 
the empirical conclusions drawn from this study will hopefully assist in the drafting of such 
policies, that have the objective of increasing the satisfaction levels reported by the spouses 
within the household. 
There appears to be support for such policies, e.g. the reduction in class sizes, that has 
been shown to improve children’s education outcomes (Bingley et al., 2005). Moreover, 
while it is clear that both genders have benefited from progress in the sphere of education, 
these advances have failed to eradicate the gender gap. Compulsory education laws are not 
sufficient to equalize attendance rates, so special policies should be enacted aimed at 
increasing the number of women benefiting from education, such as building more schools in 
remote rural areas, or providing correspondence courses. However, the costs associated with 
school attendance, as well as opportunity costs, are high and the perceived benefit of formal 
education for girls is low, which could reduce the demand for education on the part of some 
groups in certain developing countries. 
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Table 1. Mean and std. dev of dependent variables of husbands and wives
Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg TheNetherlands Portugal Spain
United-
Kingdom
Husbands
4.327 4.159 4.635 4.093 3.698 3.915 3.319 3.819 3.403 4.252 4.619 3.259 3.419 3.896
HusbIncSatisf
(1.21) (1.14) (1.05) (1.08) (1.16) (1.16) (1.13) (1.32) (1.20) (1.25) (0.93) (0.99) (1.28) (1.06)
4.256 4.157 4.580 4.067 3.703 3.847 3.165 3.910 3.292 4.327 4.706 3.071 3.385 3.993
WifeIncSatisf
(1.35) (1.22) (1.16) (1.16) (1.20) (1.26) (1.14) (1.37) (1.24) (1.27) (0.95) (1.03) (1.31) (1.06)
Number of observations 7615 8284 8356 6280 17623 5764 8814 5295 17344 1288 16442 13612 15524 8427
Wives
4.235 4.086 4.594 4.065 3.738 3.868 3.388 3.774 3.612 4.149 4.624 3.261 3.469 3.859
HusbIncSatisf
(1.30) (1.16) (1.09) (1.14) (1.16) (1.20) (1.20) (1.37) (1.20) (1.30) (0.96) (1.02) (1.33) (1.08)
4.389 4.208 4.641 4.170 3.826 3.897 3.393 3.967 3.617 4.278 4.739 3.221 3.559 3.996
WifeIncSatisf
(1.26) (1.11) (1.10) (1.09) (1.10) (1.22) (1.15) (1.31) (1.18) (1.27) (0.93) (0.99) (1.31) (1.03)
Number of observations 5523 6604 7790 6513 13589 4399 4884 3800 10403 774 12218 10271 7600 7839
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Table 2. Mean and std. dev of exogenous variables of husbands and wives
Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg TheNetherlands Portugal Spain
United-
Kingdom
Husbands
0.123 0.227 0.190 0.188 0.272 0.175 0.428 0.391 0.486 0.484 0.213 0.823 0.579 0.354
HusbPrimEduc
(0.33) (0.42) (0.39) (0.39) (0.44) (0.38) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.41) (0.38) (0.49) (0.48)
0.780 0.324 0.426 0.447 0.434 0.493 0.281 0.371 0.379 0.286 0.527 0.102 0.174 0.226
HusbSeconEduc
(0.41) (0.47) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.45) (0.48) (0.49) (0.45) (0.50) (0.30) (0.38) (0.42)
0.089 0.369 0.378 0.360 0.235 0.331 0.287 0.227 0.107 0.228 0.242 0.063 0.247 0.404
HusbHighEduc
(0.29) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.42) (0.47) (0.45) (0.42) (0.31) (0.42) (0.43) (0.24) (0.43) (0.49)
0.271 0.243 0.216 0.183 0.315 0.307 0.520 0.392 0.508 0.595 0.294 0.806 0.635 0.446
WifePrimEduc
(0.44) (0.43) (0.41) (0.39) (0.46) (0.46) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.49) (0.46) (0.40) (0.48) (0.50)
0.631 0.299 0.399 0.381 0.375 0.551 0.243 0.430 0.374 0.282 0.517 0.099 0.170 0.243
WifeSeconEduc
(0.48) (0.46) (0.49) (0.49) (0.48) (0.50) (0.43) (0.50) (0.48) (0.45) (0.50) (0.30) (0.38) (0.43)
0.084 0.393 0.378 0.433 0.241 0.139 0.235 0.167 0.088 0.119 0.176 0.064 0.195 0.303
WifeHighEduc
(0.28) (0.49) (0.48) (0.50) (0.43) (0.35) (0.42) (0.37) (0.28) (0.32) (0.38) (0.24) (0.40) (0.46)
41.602 41.095 41.893 41.394 40.685 43.079 43.163 43.310 43.082 39.958 41.769 42.187 42.015 41.614
HusbAge
(9.56) (9.04) (11.14) (9.97) (9.53) (10.15) (9.66) (10.19) (9.29) (9.03) (9.33) (11.48) (9.87) (10.97)
39.127 39.038 39.621 39.761 38.580 40.534 38.690 41.323 39.945 37.231 39.468 39.563 39.561 39.669
WifeAge
(9.53) (9.23) (10.99) (10.11) (9.69) (10.01) (9.71) (10.04) (9.23) (8.84) (9.41) (11.33) (9.71) (10.98)
2.489 2.057 2.264 1.629 2.110 2.547 4.664 1.989 3.154 2.742 2.296 2.614 2.493 1.962
AgeDifference
(4.15) (3.84) (4.22) (3.76) (4.30) (3.94) (4.25) (3.60) (3.64) (4.16) (3.71) (4.42) (3.56) (4.63)
0.476 0.354 0.363 0.450 0.428 0.272 0.413 0.432 0.412 0.367 0.374 0.401 0.401 0.333
Children< 12
(0.50) (0.48) (0.48) (0.50) (0.49) (0.45) (0.49) (0.50) (0.49) (0.48) (0.48) (0.49) (0.49) (0.47)
0.978 1.117 0.914 1.082 1.092 0.899 1.060 1.471 0.930 1.203 1.006 0.971 0.958 0.920
Children < 16
(1.01) (1.12) (1.04) (1.17) (1.11) (1.03) (0.96) (1.34) (0.91) (1.08) (1.11) (1.04) (0.95) (1.06)
0.064 0.054 0.025 0.047 0.026 0.028 0.080 0.030 0.037 0.027 0.027 0.070 0.039 0.039
WifeSelf-Employed
(0.25) (0.23) (0.16) (0.21) (0.16) (0.17) (0.27) (0.17) (0.19) (0.16) (0.16) (0.26) (0.19) (0.19)
0.565 0.655 0.786 0.738 0.609 0.624 0.356 0.501 0.417 0.500 0.649 0.557 0.343 0.710
WifeWage-Earner
(0.50) (0.48) (0.41) (0.44) (0.49) (0.48) (0.48) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.48) (0.50) (0.47) (0.45)
10.046 9.854 10.833 14.039 9.657 10.733 5.281 9.997 0.007 14.296 10.546 3.808 6.421 7.638HusbWage
(5.17) (4.80) (6.17) (8.92) (8.68) (6.25) (3.51) (11.903) (0.00) (7.13) (14.68) (3.04) (4.22) (6.28)
4.165 5.560 7.269 8.020 4.857 4.255 1.728 3.766 0.003 5.664 5.348 1.902 1.957 4.307WifeWage
(5.67) (5.19) (5.41) (10.12) (6.69) (6.32) (2.93) (6.521) (0.00) (8.31) (8.12) (2.66) (3.64) (6.80)
2025.505 1855.242 1347.727 1777.939 2212.050 1169.542 414.627 614.436 0.597 3616.738 1640.062 432.686 533.796 860.891HusbNon-WageInc
(4271.17) (5086.61) (3456.13) (4912.63) (3898.42) (3195.05) (1327.78) (1920.66) (2.53) (6378.44) (3351.43) (2051.76) (1657.48) (2637.27)
2400.428 3406.671 3907.233 4483.919 1563.077 1680.182 440.924 869.619 0.514 1944.135 732.279 342.062 348.595 1191.522WifeNon-WageInc
(4826.48) (5045.16) (4870.13) (7621.38) (3203.06) (2618.47) (1426.85) (1232.95) (2.10) (4034.56) (2068.92) (1398.80) (1247.23) (1943.32)
0.267 0.347 0.428 0.402 0.310 0.263 0.205 0.228 0.212 0.229 0.230 0.271 0.175 0.318
WifeParticipation
(0.20) (0.18) (0.12) (0.14) (0.19) (0.19) (0.22) (0.20) (0.22) (0.21) (0.20) (0.22) (0.22) (0.18)
Number of observations 7615 8284 8356 6280 17623 5764 8814 5295 17344 1288 16442 13612 15524 8427
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Wives
0.112 0.197 0.185 0.218 0.257 0.152 0.364 0.370 0.424 0.497 0.227 0.775 0.493 0.383
HusbPrimEduc
(0.32) (0.40) (0.39) (0.41) (0.44) (0.36) (0.48) (0.48) (0.49) (0.50) (0.42) (0.42) (0.50) (0.49)
0.786 0.321 0.426 0.432 0.447 0.502 0.245 0.395 0.410 0.245 0.507 0.125 0.196 0.228
HusbSeconEduc
(0.41) (0.47) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.43) (0.49) (0.49) (0.43) (0.50) (0.33) (0.40) (0.42)
0.094 0.391 0.384 0.343 0.235 0.344 0.386 0.222 0.142 0.257 0.247 0.081 0.310 0.373
HusbHighEduc
(0.29) (0.49) (0.49) (0.47) (0.42) (0.48) (0.49) (0.42) (0.35) (0.44) (0.43) (0.27) (0.46) (0.48)
0.223 0.168 0.197 0.191 0.272 0.278 0.398 0.296 0.348 0.539 0.275 0.719 0.449 0.434
WifePrimEduc
(0.42) (0.37) (0.40) (0.39) (0.44) (0.45) (0.49) (0.46) (0.48) (0.50) (0.45) (0.45) (0.50) (0.50)
0.653 0.286 0.394 0.356 0.384 0.557 0.232 0.461 0.494 0.284 0.502 0.130 0.199 0.235
WifeSeconEduc
(0.48) (0.45) (0.49) (0.48) (0.49) (0.50) (0.42) (0.50) (0.50) (0.45) (0.50) (0.34) (0.40) (0.42)
0.111 0.472 0.404 0.449 0.284 0.162 0.368 0.237 0.140 0.176 0.210 0.104 0.352 0.323
WifeHighEduc
(0.31) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.45) (0.37) (0.48) (0.43) (0.35) (0.38) (0.41) (0.31) (0.48) (0.47)
41.342 40.121 42.579 43.909 41.655 43.420 43.291 42.417 43.347 39.760 41.367 41.793 41.169 42.557
HusbAge
(10.42) (9.05) (11.19) (10.66) (10.32) (10.59) (9.80) (10.49) (9.80) (9.63) (9.86) (11.47) (10.25) (11.46)
38.254 37.784 40.109 41.807 39.281 40.671 38.792 40.012 40.146 36.809 38.805 38.923 38.600 40.173
WifeAge
(9.58) (8.54) (10.59) (10.03) (9.68) (9.96) (8.70) (9.73) (8.92) (8.55) (9.40) (10.73) (9.45) (10.90)
3.070 2.344 2.453 2.091 2.369 2.750 4.634 2.421 3.210 2.944 2.557 2.835 2.596 2.383
AgeDifference
(4.31) (4.07) (4.41) (4.01) (4.30) (4.16) (4.33) (3.92) (3.80) (4.86) (3.96) (4.62) (3.67) (4.77)
0.434 0.366 0.355 0.390 0.385 0.225 0.405 0.419 0.388 0.322 0.340 0.404 0.375 0.288
Children< 12
(0.50) (0.48) (0.48) (0.49) (0.49) (0.42) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.47) (0.47) (0.49) (0.48) (0.45)
0.858 1.101 0.911 0.968 0.926 0.727 1.023 1.318 0.844 1.004 0.873 0.896 0.857 0.798
Children < 16
(0.95) (1.05) (1.05) (1.12) (0.98) (0.91) (0.94) (1.23) (0.87) (1.01) (1.04) (0.92) (0.92) (1.01)
0.102 0.112 0.071 0.143 0.083 0.070 0.245 0.188 0.170 0.070 0.045 0.149 0.153 0.135
HusbSelf-Employed
(0.30) (0.32) (0.26) (0.35) (0.28) (0.25) (0.43) (0.39) (0.38) (0.25) (0.21) (0.36) (0.36) (0.34)
0.780 0.822 0.843 0.712 0.789 0.817 0.642 0.698 0.694 0.832 0.873 0.738 0.701 0.763
HusbWage-Earner
(0.41) (0.38) (0.36) (0.45) (0.41) (0.39) (0.48) (0.46) (0.46) (0.37) (0.33) (0.44) (0.46) (0.43)
8.419 8.635 9.894 11.547 8.354 9.171 4.315 8.241 0.006 11.764 9.084 3.439 5.495 6.527HusbWage
(6.12) (5.26) (5.99) (9.46) (8.72) (7.23) (3.68) (13.19) (0.00) (7.67) (7.40) (3.63) (5.08) (5.81)
7.048 7.963 9.234 10.295 7.706 6.552 4.302 7.218 0.007 10.903 8.080 3.328 5.313 5.922WifeWage
(5.68) (4.03) (25.62) (9.32) (6.88) (6.34) (3.24) (7.09) (0.00) (8.07) (8.75) (2.88) (4.24) (7.86)
2517.009 2538.528 1761.033 3750.770 2807.368 1872.685 894.047 1032.872 1.495 4167.538 2211.000 922.560 1130.574 1272.431HusbNon-WageInc
(5039.66) (14082.2) (4306.20) (14882.8) (5111.04) (4422.17) (2595.90) (2650.63) (4.36) (7159.73) (4490.66) (3466.66) (2893.00) (3336.48)
2329.866 2982.722 2898.999 3495.802 1015.532 1331.961 297.597 756.956 0.447 1772.625 513.332 203.070 335.230 985.124WifeNon-WageInc
(4425.93) (4907.32) (3941.09) (5560.03) (2370.71) (2236.49) (917.66) (1087.38) (1.91) (4493.73) (1470.04) (738.53) (1187.87) (1746.65)
0.397 0.441 0.455 0.460 0.409 0.353 0.441 0.388 0.452 0.385 0.325 0.433 0.416 0.388
WifeParticipation
(0.19) (0.16) (0.12) (0.15) (0.16) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.18) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.22) (0.18)
Number of observations 5523 6604 7790 6513 13589 4399 4884 3800 10403 774 12218 10271 7600 7839
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Table 3. Husband’s and wife’s income satisfaction
Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg TheNetherlands Portugal Spain
United-
Kingdom
Husbands
0.518 -0.426 2.466** -2.604** 1.398 2.277 7.247* 0.705 4.551 -0.561** 1.128 6.602 -3.559*
HusbSeconEduc
(0.11) (-0.25) (2.04) (-3.78) (0.34) (1.42) (1.75) (0.70) (1.09) (-2.74) (0.47) (1.42) (-1.82)
2.244 1.819 4.774** 0.464 9.578** 3.541** 3.280 2.341* 3.599 1.129** 2.211** 2.508** 1.602**
HusbHighEduc
(1.26) (1.31) (3.45) (0.80) (2.66) (2.18) (1.36) (1.70) (1.35) (3.48) (3.92) (2.05) (3.39)
-0.598 -0.632 -2.641** 1.816** -3.151** -1.620 -1.872 -0.976 -0.003 0.261 -0.469 -1.798 0.068
WifeHighEduc
(-1.50) (-0.89) (-2.17) (3.83) (-2.02) (-1.15) (-0.72) (-0.56) (-0.00) (0.90) (-0.22) (-1.10) (0.17)
HusbAge 0.021** 0.011** 0.003 0.024** 0.030** -0.043** 0.025** 0.064** -0.010** 0.033** 0.018** 0.007** 0.028** 0.008
(4.80) (3.07) (1.26) (4.12) (10.28) (-4.92) (7.28) (8.59) (-2.67) (2.31) (6.14) (4.20) (8.90) (1.33)
AgeDifference -0.022 -0.003 0.009 -0.026** -0.008 -0.001 -0.004 0.004 -0.048 -0.007 0.004 0.013 -0.005
(-0.76) (-0.23) (0.58) (-2.72) (-0.29) (-0.05) (-0.10) (0.37) (-1.23) (-1.50) (0.53) (0.67) (-0.72)
Children < 12 -0.103** -0.017 -0.057* -0.052 -0.096** -0.013 0.010 -0.067 -0.047 -0.071 -0.075** -0.002 0.060** 0.019
(-2.20) (-0.72) (-1.90) (-0.93) (-4.30) (-0.37) (0.31) (-1.54) (-1.35) (-1.28) (-3.45) (-0.11) (2.25) (0.55)
Children< 16 0.012 -0.050** -0.120** -0.018 0.072** -0.135** -0.071** -0.035 -0.066** 0.141* -0.011 -0.021 -0.095** -0.087**
(0.40) (-2.40) (-5.81) (-0.55) (4.69) (-2.88) (-3.24) (-1.18) (-2.42) (1.79) (-0.74) (-1.41) (-4.76) (-2.49)
HusbWage 0.087** 0.032** 0.020 0.188** 0.011* 0.055* 0.105** 0.010 0.307** 0.037 0.003 0.037** 0.037** 0.022
(3.69) (2.66) (1.46) (3.84) (1.90) (1.93) (7.53) (0.23) (4.83) (0.83) (0.16) (4.35) (3.76) (0.68)
WifeWage 0.014 0.019** 0.033** -0.032 0.016** -0.010 0.030** 0.018 0.099* 0.006 0.038** 0.016** 0.028** 0.035
(1.32) (2.73) (3.84) (-0.98) (2.63) (-0.54) (4.45) (0.49) (1.85) (0.29) (4.01) (3.46) (4.51) (1.48)
HusbNon-WageInc 0.241 -0.166** -0.577 0.869 0.590 0.631 0.104** -6.686 -0.949 0.005 -4.158** 0.040** -0.086** 0.748
(1.01) (-2.95) (-1.17) (1.25) (1.58) (0.25) (3.94) (-0.51) (-0.50) (0.04) (-3.11) (2.46) (-2.23) (0.14)
WifeNon-WageInc 0.034 0.116* 0.902** -0.420 -1.556** 0.612 0.039 -27.193 2.385 -0.367* -0.459 0.044 -0.008 1.340
(0.13) (1.90) (2.36) (-0.88) (-3.49) (0.17) (1.28) (-1.39) (0.68) (-1.86) (-0.22) (1.50) (-0.15) (0.17)
WifeParticipation -0.083 -0.248** -0.206 0.908** 0.085 0.173 -0.177 0.387* -0.221 0.749** 0.207** -0.073 0.034 -0.294*
(-0.56) (-2.09) (-1.55) (2.88) (1.07) (1.06) (-1.62) (1.66) (-0.82) (2.41) (2.55) (-1.04) (0.34) (-1.84)
3051.17 5198.11 2883.17 1176.81 8369.92 902.67 1307.60 1277.06 2132.94 246.20 6668.60 5873.75 3354.24 1408.33
LM
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
63.29 41.32 93.74 70.50 240.28 193.94 111.38 135.69 57.81 45.46 212.57 137.24 214.70 125.96
Hausman 1
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
0.54 0.23 6.20 0.68 2.30 4.89 0.18 0.33 1.72 0.53 2.90 1.32 0.18 1.05
Hausman 2
(0.0003) (1.0000) (0.6246) (0.9996) (0.9703) (0.7688) (1.0000) (1.0000) (0.9885) (0.9998) (0.9406) (0.9953) (1.0000) (0.9979)
Selected estimation FE HT HT HT HT HT HT HT HT HT HT HT HT HT
Number of observations 7615 8284 8356 4615 17622 5764 8814 5295 7303 1288 16442 13612 15524 8427
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Wives
-2.173 1.398 -0.964 1.744 -4.233 -10.376** 1.517 0.734 0.780** -2.785 -1.824** -0.123 4.594** 1.429
WifeSeconEduc
(-1.08) (1.09) (-1.57) (2.18) (-0.80) (-2.78) (1.09) (0.94) (2.10) (-1.37) (-2.57) (-0.20) (3.18) (1.27)
5.188* 1.584** 1.233** 1.674** 1.964 3.534* -0.842 0.125 0.734 1.049 2.201** 1.094* 0.424 1.878**
HusbHighEduc
(1.86) (2.76) (2.67) (2.84) (0.70) (1.74) (-0.46) (0.25) (0.91) (0.39) (2.00) (1.74) (0.51) (5.65)
1.422 0.327 0.066 0.476 2.153 -2.697 4.177** 1.271** 0.291 0.287 0.965 1.875** 1.109 0.410
WifeHighEduc
(0.77) (0.58) (0.14) (0.81) (1.32) (-1.56) (2.29) (2.51) (0.25) (0.08) (1.31) (3.20) (1.53) (1.17)
WifeAge 0.001 0.014** 0.010** 0.028** 0.028** -0.055** 0.026** 0.028** -0.002 -0.011 0.022** -0.000 0.043** 0.024**
(0.12) (3.01) (3.16) (5.17) (8.89) (-3.22) (4.15) (4.04) (-0.38) (-0.56) (6.94) (-0.01) (7.76) (4.56)
AgeDifference 0.010 -0.007 0.011 0.020* 0.018 -0.064* 0.032* 0.002 -0.002 0.005 0.015 0.007 0.014 0.002
(0.50) (-0.70) (1.30) (1.82) (0.44) (-1.85) (1.85) (0.15) (-0.19) (0.20) (1.20) (1.32) (0.98) (0.31)
Children < 12 -0.124** -0.045 -0.129** -0.082 -0.095** -0.030 0.087* -0.065 -0.058* -0.026 -0.093** 0.017 -0.040 -0.104**
(-2.16) (-1.57) (-3.85) (-1.54) (-3.95) (-0.54) (1.90) (-1.22) (-1.65) (-0.28) (-3.68) (0.68) (-0.96) (-3.04)
Children< 16 0.010 -0.011 -0.089** -0.015 0.060** -0.098 -0.090** -0.088** -0.000 0.139 -0.017 -0.032 0.014 -0.105**
(0.26) (-0.47) (-3.83) (-0.46) (3.52) (-1.40) (-2.86) (-2.56) (-0.01) (1.16) (-1.03) (-1.61) (0.44) (-3.22)
HusbWage 0.051** 0.016 0.056** 0.028 0.014** 0.069** 0.020** 0.268** 0.262** 0.078** 0.101** 0.036** 0.054** 0.168**
(3.39) (1.45) (4.85) (0.65) (2.36) (2.29) (1.97) (5.92) (4.99) (2.02) (7.32) (6.12) (6.18) (7.31)
WifeWage 0.005 0.010 -0.001 -0.004 0.017** 0.002 0.031** 0.041 0.053 -0.059 -0.006 0.021** 0.003 -0.097**
(0.36) (0.95) (-0.08) (-0.12) (2.57) (0.08) (2.42) (0.87) (1.03) (-1.64) (-0.49) (2.44) (0.31) (-3.79)
HusbNon-WageInc 0.459 0.009 -1.300** 0.659* 0.660** -1.274 0.075** 6.870 3.473** -0.383* -0.770 0.038** -0.008 9.967**
(1.56) (0.36) (-2.82) (1.89) (2.11) (-0.43) (3.04) (0.60) (1.98) (-1.83) (-0.56) (2.64) (-0.21) (2.26)
WifeNon-WageInc -0.492 -0.073 -0.798 -2.529** -1.085** -3.990 -0.057 29.381 -0.914 -0.021 -15.854** -0.014 -0.011 -2.975
(-1.59) (-1.13) (-1.63) (-2.97) (-1.97) (-0.80) (-1.15) (1.19) (-0.28) (-0.09) (-5.52) (-0.21) (-0.16) (-0.43)
WifeParticipation 0.062 -0.013 0.088 -0.301 -0.034 0.238 0.008 0.215 0.786** 0.536 0.102 0.219** 0.125 0.456**
(0.42) (-0.10) (0.61) (-1.13) (-0.42) (1.18) (0.05) (0.89) (3.20) (1.22) (1.24) (2.75) (1.01) (3.60)
1992.82 3054.99 2499.05 1391.77 5514.11 603.45 799.41 944.91 2461.96 133.32 4175.75 4105.12 1257.95 994.30
LM
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
57.56 38.68 100.95 52.46 148.29 86.84 132.36 21.15 71.86 15.99 94.71 91.59 127.35 121.99
Hausman 1
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0068) (0.0000) (0.0425) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
0.82 2.01 9.08 2.16 0.00 0.08 1.23 4.72 2.07 0.07 0.31 0.03 0.45 0.17
Hausman 2
(0.9991) (0.9806) (0.3353) (0.9756) (1.0000) (1.0000) (0.9963) (0.7876) (0.9787) (1.0000) (1.0000) (1.0000) (0.9999) (1.0000)
Selected estimation HT HT HT HT HT HT HT HT HT HT HT HT HT HT
Number of observations 5523 6604 7790 5187 13589 4399 4884 3800 8317 774 12218 10271 7600 7839
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